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SIGNS OF DANGER-THE THIRD CIRCUIT EMPHASIZES
FORESEEABILITY AS THE CRUCIAL ELEMENT IN THE
"STATE-CREATED DANGER" THEORY:
MORSE v. LOWER MERION SCHOOL DISTRICT
I. INTRODuCrION
According to the philosopher Alan Gewirth, "A duty is a requirement
that some action be performed or not be performed; in the latter, negative
case, the requirement constitutes a prohibition."1 Traditionally, the
United States Constitution has been regarded as imposing negative duties
on the states; that is, the states are prohibited from depriving persons of
their constitutionally guaranteed rights. 2 The Constitution does not, how-
l. Alan Gewirth, Are There Any Absolute Rights?, in THEORIES OF RIGHTS 91-109
(Jeremy Waldron, ed. 1984). The right to life, granted by the Constitution, im-
poses the negative duty to refrain from killing a person withoutjustification. See id.
(stating that "[a] right is fulfilled when the correlative duty is carried out, i.e. when
the required action is performed or the prohibited action is not performed"); see
also Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Ju-
dicial Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16, 32 (1913) ("'A duty or a legal obligation is that
which one ought or ought not to do. Duty and right are correlative terms. When a
right is invaded, a duty is violated.'" (quoting Lake Shore & M.S.R. Co. v. Kurtz, 37
N.E. 303, 304 (1894))).
2. See DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 195
(1989) (noting that Due Process Clause imposes negative duties on states). Accord-
ing to the Court in DeShaney:
The [Due Process] Clause is phrased as a limitation on the State's power
to act, not as a guarantee of certain minimal levels of safety and security.
It forbids the State itself to deprive individuals of life, liberty, or property
without "due process of law," but its language cannot fairly be extended
to impose an affirmative obligation on the State to ensure that those in-
terests do not come to harm through other means.
Id.; see Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 317-18 (1980) (holding that although states
may not prohibit abortions, there is no affirmative duty to provide funding for this
procedure); Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 74 (1972) (holding that state has no
affirmative duty to provide adequate housing); Jackson v. City of Joliet, 715 F.2d
1200, 1203 (7th Cir. 1983) (stating that Fourteenth Amendment was adopted "at
the height of laissez-faire thinking" and "sought to protect Americans from oppres-
sion by state government, not to secure them basic governmental services"); Bow-
ers v. DeVito, 686 F.2d 616, 618 (7th Cir. 1982) (describing Constitution as
"charter of negative liberties"); see also Sheldon Nahmod, Symposium: Section 1983
Discourse: The Move From Constitution to Tort, 77 GEO. L.J. 1719, 1747-48 (1989)
[hereinafter Nahmod, Section 1983 Discourse] ("By analogy to the tort doctrine that
strangers ordinarily owe no Good Samaritan affirmative duties to one another, tort
rhetoric makes it easier for courts to treat the Constitution as a charter of negative
liberties, a position the Supreme Court has in fact recently taken."); Deborah Aus-
tern Colson, Note, Safe Enough to Learn: Placing an Affirmative Duty of Protection on
Public Schools Under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983, 30 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 169, 173
(1995) (noting tradition in federal courts of treating Constitution as charter of
negative liberties); Adam Michael Greenfield, Note, Annie Get Your Gun 'Cause Help
Ain't Comin ': The Need for Constitutional Protection from Peer Abuse in Public Schools, 43
DuKE L.J. 588, 599 (1993) (noting that DeShaney is consistent with reading of Due
(947)
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ever, impose corresponding affirmative duties on a state to secure these
rights for its citizens or to protect its citizens from violations of their rights
by third parties. 3
There are several exceptions, however, where courts have imposed an
affirmative duty on a state to protect the constitutional rights of its citi-
zens. 4 One such exception applies when a state creates a dangerous situa-
tion that leads to a violation of a person's constitutional rights to life or
personal security. 5 For example, even if the state did not directly deprive
Process Clause as only requiring states to refrain from violating citizens' constitu-
tional rights); MelindaJ. Seeds, Note, Throwing Out the Baby with the Bathwater: The
Fourth Circuit Rejects a State Duty of Affirmative Protection in Pinder v. Johnson, 74
N.C. L. REv. 1719, 1741 n.158 (1996) (noting tradition of recognizing Constitution
as imposing negative duties only); Amy Sinden, Comment, In Search of Affirmative
Duties Toward Children Under a Post- DeShaney Constitution, 139 U. PA. L. REv. 227,
230 (1990) ("'The men who wrote the Bill of Rights were not concerned that gov-
ernment might do too little for the people but that it might do too much to
them."' (quoting Jackson, 715 F.2d at 1203)); Due Process Clause-Custodial Relation-
ships-Third Circuit Finds No Affirmative Duty of Care by School Officials to Their Stu-
dents. -D.R. v. Middle Bucks Area Vocational Technical School, 972 F.2d 1364 (3d
Cir. 1992), cert. denied, No. 92-816, 1993 U.S. LEXIS 897 (Jan. 19, 1993), 106 HARv.
L. REv. 1224, 1224 (1993) (notingJudge Richard Posner's reference to Constitu-
tion as charter of negative liberties that restricts state action and does not impose
affirmative duties). But see Susan Bandes, The Negative Constitution: A Critique, 88
MICH. L. REv. 2271, 2279-85 (1990) (criticizing distinction between act and omis-
sion); David Currie, Positive and Negative Constitutional Rights, 53 U. CHI. L. REv.
864, 887 (1986) (cautioning against reading too much into generally accepted
principle that Constitution provides solely negative liberties); Thomas A. Eaton &
Michael Wells, Governmental Inaction as a Constitutional Tort: DeShaney and Its After-
math, 66 WAsH. L. REv. 107, 116 (1991) (noting that although it has been inter-
preted to impose only negative duties, language, history and prior judicial
construction of Fourteenth Amendment neither compels nor forbids recognition
of affirmative constitutional duties); Michael J. Gerhardt, The Ripple Effects of
Slaughter-House: A Critique of a Negative Rights View of the Constitution, 43 VAND. L.
REv. 409, 413 (1990) (suggesting that Fourteenth Amendment is most abundant
source of affirmative duties in Constitution).
3. See DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 195 ("[N] othing in the language of the Due Pro-
cess Clause itself requires the State to protect the life, liberty, and property of its
citizens against invasion by private actors."). But see Eaton & Wells, supra note 2, at
107 (noting that DeShaney poses question of whether Constitution is merely charter
of negative liberties or whether it also provides positive rights to governmental
assistance). Professors Eaton and Wells comment that "[t]he affirmative duty
problem has long fascinated courts and commentators, because it raises perplex-
ing philosophical questions about liberty, utility, and moral responsibility." Id. at
108.
4. See Uhlrig v. Harder, 64 F.3d 567, 572 (10th Cir. 1995) ("While state actors
are generally only liable under the Due Process Clause for their own acts and not
for private violence, there are two recognized exceptions to this rule: (1) the spe-
cial relationship doctrine; and (2) the 'danger creation' theory."); Karen M. Blum,
DeShaney, Creation of Danger and Culpability, 27 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 435, 461 (1994)
(same).
5. See Gregory v. City of Rogers, 974 F.2d 1006, 1010 (8th Cir. 1992) (holding
that state's affirmative duty to protect arises under Due Process Clause when state
places individuals in dangerous positions that they would not have otherwise
faced); Bowers, 686 F.2d at 618 (stating that "if the state puts a man in a position of
[Vol. 43: p. 947
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the person of his or her constitutional rights, a number of courts have
found sufficient reason to impose an affirmative duty on the state because
it created the circumstances under which the violation occurred. 6 This
imputation of liability is commonly referred to as the "state-created dan-
ger" theory.
7
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit adopted the
state-created danger theory in 1996 when it decided Kneipp v. Tedder.8 In
Kneipp, the court held that the theory was a viable mechanism for bringing
a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 9 Only a year later, the Third Circuit con-
danger from private persons and then fails to protect him . . . it is as much an
active tortfeasor as if it had thrown him into a snake pit"); see alsoJulie Shapiro,
Snake Pits and Unseen Actors: Constitutional Liability for Indirect Harm, 62 U. CiN. L.
REv. 883, 926 (1994) (stating that state-created danger cases are strongest cases for
liability under section 1983); William W. Watkinson, Jr., Note, Shades of DeShaney:
Official Liability Under 42 U.S. C. Section 1983 for Sexual Abuse in the Public Schools, 45
CASE W. REs. L. REv. 1237, 1284 (1995) (stating that Due Process Clause of Four-
teenth 'Amendment normally imposes negative rights, but that states may have af-
firmative obligations in certain cases).
6. See Pinder v. Johnson, 54 F.3d 1169, 1180 (4th Cir. 1995) (noting that
DeShaney decision did not obliterate state's duty to protect individuals where state
affirmatively acted to create dangerous situation or render individuals more sus-
ceptible to danger); Reed v. Gardner, 986 F.2d 1122, 1125 (7th Cir. 1993)
("DeShaney ... leaves the door open for liability in situations where the state creates
a dangerous situation or renders citizens more vulnerable to danger."); Bowers, 686
F.2d at 618 (noting that state has obligation to protect when it creates danger that
harms people); see also Ashley Smith, Comment, Students Hurting Students: Who Will
Pay?, 34 Hous. L. REv. 579, 606 (1997) ("If the state creates the dangerous situa-
tion that results in the victim's harm, and the harm would not otherwise have
occurred, then it is just that the state be deemed responsible and compensate the
victim."); Robert D. Tennyson, Note, Recent Development: Leffall v. Dallas Independ-
ent School District: The Fifth Circuit Finds Few Duties in the Public Schools, 69 TUL. L.
REv. 1061, 1066 (1995) (noting that courts have held DeShaney to provide for im-
plied duty where state created dangerous situation); Watkinson, supra note 5, at
1280 (stating that invocation of state-created danger theory is limited to situations
where state actors create danger by affirmative actions).
7. See Kneipp v. Tedder, 95 F.3d 1199, 1205 (3d Cir. 1996) (noting that state-
created danger theory had been utilized by several other courts of appeals); see also
Uhlrig, 64 F.3d at 572 (referring to "danger-creation" theory).
8. 95 F.3d 1199 (3d Cir. 1996).
9. See id. at 1205 (stating that viability of state-created danger theory had pre-
viously been considered in Third Circuit, however, before Kneipp, court had never
been presented with appropriate set of factual circumstances to invoke theory); see
also Joseph A. Slobodzian, Police Liability Suit Is Revived, PHILA. INQUIRER, Sept. 26,
1996, at B1. ("In a ruling that creates new grounds for civil-rights suits ... the
[Third Circuit] has revived a lawsuit by the parents of a Philadelphia woman who
passed out on a frigid night and suffered severe brain damage after police stopped
her for drunkenness and then let her walk home.").- One commentator noted
that, ironically, under the state-created danger theory, the police may have an af-
firmative duty to a person regardless of whether they decide to take the person
into custody or not. See id. (noting that although police officers have been sued
for years by people they arrest, this ruling ironically exposes them to suit by people
they do not arrest). For an in-depth discussion of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, see infra notes
18-27 and accompanying text.
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fronted the issue again in Morse v. Lower Merion School District.1 ° Using the
test adopted in Kneipp, the court held that the plaintiff did not meet the
requirements of the state-created danger theory."i
This Casebrief examines the differences between the two cases and
provides a guide for attorneys who are contemplating or bringing section
1983 actions in the Third Circuit.1 2 Part II discusses the birth of the state-
created danger theory in the Supreme Court and its evolution in the lower
federal courts, including the Third Circuit.' 3 Next, Part III discusses the
factual background and the Third Circuit's analysis in the Morse case. 14 In
addition, Part III describes the test employed by the Third Circuit in state-
created danger cases.1 5 Part IV analyzes the differences between the two
most recent Third Circuit decisions in this area, Kneipp and Morse.' 6 Fi-
nally, Part V discusses how a practitioner should approach this issue in the
Third Circuit. 17
II. BACKGROUND: THE ORIGIN OF THE STATE-CREATED DANGER THEORY
OF LIABILITY UNDER SECTION 1983
A. Section 1983
Section 1983 permits parties to sue persons or entities "acting under
color of state law" for the violation of their federal constitutional or statu-
tory rights.18 By itself, section 1983 does not create any substantive
10. 132 F.3d 902 (3d Cir. 1997).
11. See id. at 916. (holding that plaintiff failed to meet state-created danger
theory test, as adopted in Kneipp, which requires that state actor willfully create
dangerous situation that leads to direct harm to foreseeable plaintiff).
12. For a comparison of Kneipp and Morse, see infra notes 84-103 and accom-
panying text.
13. For a background discussion of section 1983 actions utilizing the state-
created danger theory in the Supreme Court and the lower federal courts, see infra
notes 28-68 and accompanying text.
14. For a discussion of the Third Circuit's opinion in Morse, see infra notes 69-
83 and accompanying text.
15. For a discussion of the Third Circuit's application of the Kneipp test to the
facts in Morse, see infra notes 75-83 and accompanying text.
16. For a discussion of how Kneipp and Morse are distinguishable, see infra
notes 84-103 and accompanying text.
17. For a practitioner's guide to bringing a section 1983 action under the
state-created danger theory, see infra notes 104-10 and accompanying text.
18. See Parrat v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 535 (1981) (stating that one of two
essential elements in section 1983 actions is "whether the conduct complained of
was committed by a person acting under color of state law"), overruled by Daniels v.
Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986); Wood v. Ostrander, 879 F.2d 583, 587 (9th Cir.
1989) (stating that to bring action under section 1983, plaintiff must demonstrate
(1) that defendant was acting under color of state law and (2) that defendant's
conduct deprived plaintiff of federal constitutional or statutory right); see also SHEL-
DON H. NAHMOD, CML RIGHTS AND CIVIL LIBERTIES LITIGATION: THE LAW OF SEC-
TION 1983 § 1.03 (3d ed. 1991) [hereinafter NAHMOD, CIVIL RIGHTS] (noting that
"[section] 1983 was designed both to prevent the states from violating the Four-
teenth Amendment and certain federal statutes and to compensate injured plain-
[Vol. 43: p. 947
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rights.1 9 Instead, section 1983 serves as a vehicle through which plaintiffs
can obtain relief for violations of their substantive rights provided by
either the Constitution or federal statutes. 20 Potential defendants in sec-
tion 1983 suits include municipalities, counties and individuals who are
acting under governmental authority. 21 The state itself, however, cannot
be a defendant.
22
tiffs for deprivations of their federal rights") (citing Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247
(1978)); RicHARD C. TURKINGTON & ANITA L. ALLEN, PRIVAC: CASES AND MATERI-
ALS 163 (2d ed. 1998) (stating that section 1983 has recently become significant
vehicle for enforcing Fourteenth Amendment rights).
The text of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides in pertinent part that:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, cus-
tom or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be sub-
jected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immu-
nities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party
injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for
redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994).
19. See Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3 (1979) (stating that section
1983 is remedy for deprivation of constitutional rights); Cornelius v. Town of
Highland Lake, 880 F.2d 348, 352 (11th Cir. 1989) (finding that section 1983 by
itself does not create any substantive rights, but instead provides remedies for dep-
rivations of rights created by Constitution or federal laws). But see Charles F. Aber-
nathy, Symposium: Section 1983 and Constitutional Torts, 77 GEO. L.J. 1441, 1441
(1989) (stating that this procedural vehicle has altered substantive constitutional
rights). According to Professor Abernathy, "Section 1983 has not merely served as
a vehicle for enforcing constitutional law, it has led to the making of a new consti-
tutional law as the Court has adjusted constitutional norms to permit their enforce-
ment ... ." Id.
20. See Greenfield, supra note 2, at 593 (stating that statute is solely vehicle for
enforcement of rights established by Constitution or federal laws and provides no
substantive rights by itself); Watkinson, supra note 5, at 1245 (stating that section
1983 "creates a vehicle whereby independent violations of statutory or constitu-
tional law can be redressed"). Although section 1983 does not explicitly provide
any substantive rights, it has been described as a sword or, alternatively, the means
through which the Fourteenth Amendment is transformed from a shield into a
sword. See Marshall S. Shapo, Constitutional Tort: Monroe v. Pape and the Frontiers
Beyond, 60 Nw. U. L. REv. 277, 322 (1965) (referring to section 1983 as "statutory
sword" to protect violations of "constitutional shield"); Nancy L. Harris, Casebrief,
Third Circuit Review: Civil Rights-Third Circuit Narrows Scope of Public School District
§ 1983 Liability for the Sexual Abuse of Students: D.R. v. Middle Bucks Area Vocational
Technical School (1992), 38 VILL. L. REv. 1100, 1103 (1993) (referring to descrip-
tion of section 1983 as statute that transforms Fourteenth Amendment from shield
into sword).
21. See Monell v. Department of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978) (hold-
ing that municipalities may be defendants under section 1983, but only if munici-
pality directly causes constitutional violation through its policies or customs
because respondeat superior theory is not available in this type of case); NAHMOD,
CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 18, § 1.06 (stating that in certain situations, cities, coun-
ties and other local government entities are amenable to suit as "persons" under
section 1983).
22. See Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 64 (1989) (holding
that states and their agencies are not "persons" that can be sued under section
1983).
1998]
5
Madden: Signs of Danger - The Third Circuit Emphasizes Foreseeability as
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1998
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
Interestingly, some commentators have likened section 1983 cases to
"constitutional tort claims." 23 Although there are significant differences
between section 1983 analysis and standard tort principles, some similari-
ties do exist.24 As in standard tort claims, for example, the existence of a
legal duty is crucial to establishing constitutional liability in section 1983
cases. 25 For years, courts have recognized that, while a state may not de-
prive persons of their constitutional rights, a state generally has no affirm-
ative duty to actively secure these rights for every person.2 6 It has
23. See Nahmod, Section 1983 Discourse, supra note 2, at 1719 (noting that, in
section 1983 cases, Supreme Court has shifted from using constitutional rhetoric
to expressing tort rhetoric); see also Monell, 436 U.S. at 691 (using term "constitu-
tional tort"); Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 417 (1976) (stating that section
1983 "creates a species of tort liability"); Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 171 (1961)
(advising that section 1983 should be considered in context of tort liability in
which people are responsible for natural consequences of their actions), overruled
by Monell, 436 U.S. at 658; Bart v. Telford, 677 F.2d 622, 625 (7th Cir. 1982) (refer-
ring to section 1983 as tort statute). But see Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 107
(1976) (distinguishing between tort and constitutional claims by stating that medi-
cal malpractice may initiate tort claims, but not necessarily constitutional claims);
Gregory v. City of Rogers, 974 F.2d 1006, 1009 (8th Cir. 1992) ("Many harms,
though caused by a state actor, do not fall within the scope of section 1983, for
section 1983 does not turn the Fourteenth Amendment into a font of tort law that
supersedes the tort systems already available under individual state laws."). Be-
cause this Casebrief focuses narrowly on the Third Circuit, the question of whether
the Supreme Court employs constitutional rhetoric or tort principles in its section
1983 cases will not be discussed, nor will the correctness of either approach be
analyzed. For a detailed discussion and analysis of these issues, see Nahmod, Sec-
tion 1983 Discourse, supra note 2.
24. See Harris, supra note 20, at 1103 ("Section 1983 is often referred to as
having created a 'constitutional tort' claim because it incorporates both constitu-
tional and tort law principles."). If a plaintiff can state a claim under section 1983,
there are several advantages to be gained that are not available in ordinary tort
suits. See id. (noting that recovery of attorneys' fees, wide range of rights that may
be litigated, increase in number of potential defendants, generous federal law stan-
dards for assessing damages and circumvention of state law immunity are all poten-
tial advantages gained by suing under section 1983).
25. See Bowers v. DeVito, 686 F.2d 616, 618 (7th Cir. 1982) (holding that if
state "has no federal constitutional duty to provide ... protection its failure to do
so is not actionable under section 1983"); cf W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER &
KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 358 (5th ed. 1984) ("[I]t should be recognized that
'duty' is not sacrosanct in itself, but is only an expression of the sum total of those
considerations of policy which lead the law to say that the plaintiff is entitled to
protection.").
26. See DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 196
(1989) (stating that constitutional due process clauses do not bestow affirmative
rights to governmental assistance); Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 317-18 (1980)
(holding that although state may not abridge women's constitutional right to have
abortions, there is no obligation on state's part to fund abortions); Lindsey v.
Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 74 (1972) (holding that Constitution does not create affirma-
tive duty on state's part to provide housing); Jackson v. City of Joliet, 715 F.2d
1200, 1204 (7th Cir. 1983) ("[A]s currently understood, the concept of liberty in
the Fourteenth Amendment does not include a right to basic services, whether
competently provided or otherwise."); Bowers, 686 F.2d at 618 (stating that nor-
mally, Constitution only imposes negative duties).
[Vol. 43: p. 947
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gradually become apparent, however, that there are instances in which a
state owes an affirmative duty to protect its citizens from violations of their
constitutional rights by a state actor or even private persons. 27
B. The Supreme Court's Creation of the State-Created Danger Theory
One instance in which a state has an affirmative duty to protect a
person's constitutional rights is when a state places the person into cus-
tody or involuntary confinement, thereby limiting his or her own ability to
protect these rights. 28 In Martinez v. California,29 the United States
Supreme Court first addressed the issue of whether a state owes an affirm-
ative duty to a person not in its custody.3 0 In Martinez, a convicted sex
offender murdered a fifteen-year-old girl five months after his release on
parole. 3 1 The plaintiffs, the victim's parents, filed suit under section 1983
alleging that the parole board violated the victim's constitutional rights by
releasing the parolee with knowledge of his likelihood for recidivism. 3 2
The Court acknowledged that the board's decision to release the pa-
rolee could be characterized as an action.3 3 The Court held, however,
that the murder did not constitute action for which the board could be
held liable under section 1983 because the parolee was not acting as the
27. See DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 198-200 (holding that affirmative duty to protect
exists only in custody situations or, alternatively, when state creates danger that
causes harm); Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 315-16 (1982) (holding that
state owes affirmative duty to those involuntarily confined in mental institution);
Estelle, 429 U.S. at 103 (holding that state has affirmative duty to protect prisoners
by virtue of their custody situation).
28. See Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 315-16 (finding that person involuntarily con-
fined to mental institution is owed affirmative duty of protection by state due to
custodial nature of situation); Estelle, 429 U.S. at 103-04 (finding that prisoners'
abilities to protect their own rights are sufficiently curtailed so as to impose affirm-
ative duty on states to protect their rights while in custody). For a discussion of
what constitutes custody and how the courts view schools in this regard, see infra
note 53 and accompanying text.
29. 444 U.S. 277 (1980).
30. See Mary Morrissey, Comment, Constitutional Law-Public Schools Have No
Duty to Prevent Students from Infringing on Other Students' Constitutional Rights- D.R.
v. Middle Bucks Area Vocational Technical School, 972 F.2d 1364 (3d Cir. 1992),
cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1045 (1993), 27 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 231, 231 n.1 (1993)
(noting that Martinez was first case to suggest that failure to protect persons may
give rise to section 1983 liability).
31. See Martinez, 444 U.S. at 279. In Martinez, the parolee had been sentenced
to a term of one to twenty years with the recommendation that he not be paroled.
See id. Nevertheless, five years after he was incarcerated, the parole board decided
to release him under his mother's supervision even though the board was fully
aware of the parolee's history, propensities and his likelihood for recidivism. See
id.
32. See id. at 279-80 (noting that complaint alleged that board's decision to
release prisoner directly caused victim's murder).
33. See id. at 284-85 (stating that decision to release parolee from prison con-
stituted action).
1998] 953
7
Madden: Signs of Danger - The Third Circuit Emphasizes Foreseeability as
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1998
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
board's agent.3 4 In addition, the Court noted that the connection be-
tween the parolee's release and the murder was too attenuated because
the parole board was not aware of any danger to the specific victim.35 The
Court stated that its holding did not mean that a parole board or officer
could never be held liable under section 1983 for the release of a parolee,
but that in this case, the consequences of the release were too remote to
invoke liability. 36 Following this decision, numerous courts of appeals in-
terpreted Martinez to stand for the proposition that once a state actor
learns of a danger to a specific victim and conveys a willingness to assist
that victim, a special relationship is created whereby that state actor ac-
cepts an affirmative duty to protect the victim.
3 7
34. See id. (stating that, although decision to release parolee from prison con-
stituted action by state, action of parolee five months after release does not come
within definition of state action). The Court in Martinez carefully distinguished
between "duty" and "deprivation" by stating that, regardless of whether the parole
board could be considered to have a "duty" as a matter of tort law, the board "did
not 'deprive' [the victim] of life within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment." Id. at 285. There seems to be little difference, however, in the Court's
distinction between "duty" and "deprivation" and Alan Gewirth's distinction be-
tween "affirmative duties" and "negative duties." See Gewirth, supra note 1, at 93
(noting that negative duties are prohibitions on certain conduct).
35. See Martinez, 444 U.S. at 285 (noting that parole board was not aware of
special danger to victim as distinguished from general public and therefore causal
link between board's action and danger created was too attenuated to impose
liability).
36. See id. ("We need not and do not decide that a parole officer could never
be deemed to 'deprive' someone of life by action taken in connection with the
release of a prisoner on parole."); Eaton & Wells, supra note 2, at 153 (noting that
Supreme Court has not closed door on liability where state official is responsible
for victim's harm at hands of third party). According to Professors Eaton and
Wells:
Martinez clearly curbs the ability of courts to impose constitutional tort
liability on officials whose decisions facilitate private wrongs. It would be
a mistake, however, to treat Martinez as a blanket rejection of all constitu-
tional claims arising from fact patterns where a private actor is the imme-
diate source of danger. The Court itself cautioned against such a broad
reading of the case, and lower federal courts sometimes have encoun-
tered circumstances warranting the imposition of liability. The crucial
factor distinguishing these cases from Martinez is the extent of the state's
contribution to the plaintiffs peril.
Id. (footnote omitted).
37. See DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 197-
98 n.4 (1989) (noting formation of "special relationship" theory in lower federal
courts). The DeShaney Court recognized that several courts of appeals had inter-
preted Martinez to mean that a special relationship arose between a state actor and
a victim once the state actor learned of a specified danger to the victim and
demonstrated a willingness to protect the victim. See id. (noting that this special
relationship was held to give rise to affirmative duty, enforceable through Four-
teenth Amendment's Due Process Clause, to adequately protect victim against dan-
ger); see also Greenfield, supra note 2, at 598 n.46 ("Several courts of appeals
subsequently interpreted [the language in Martinez] to mean that once the state
learns of a danger to an identified victim and indicates a willingness to provide
protection, a special relationship is created that gives rise to an affirmative duty.").
Actually, in the years between Martinez and DeShaney, a circuit split developed over
[Vol. 43: p. 947
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In DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Services,3 8 the
plaintiffs attempted to utilize this special relationship theory in a suit
against a state agency for failing to prevent the abuse of a child who was in
his father's custody.3 9 The plaintiffs posited that because the agency knew
about the abuse and took steps to intervene, a special relationship existed,
thereby creating a duty on the agency's part to protect the child.40 The
United States Supreme Court disagreed and held that the theory was inap-
plicable in this context because a special relationship exists only when a
whether a state's awareness of harm to a particular person could give rise to an
affirmative duty on the state's part to protect that individual, outside of a custodial
setting. Compare Commonwealth Bank & Trust Co. v. Russell, 825 F.2d 12, 14-16
(3d Cir. 1987) ("It is clear ... that [section] 1983 is not limited to cases of direct
harm inflicted by state officials. This is suggested by the distinction made in Marti-
nez between that victim there and those who the authorities knew face a 'special
danger.'"), and Carlson v. Conklin, 813 F.2d 769, 772 (6th Cir. 1987) (following
other circuits that held that due process violation might exist if special relationship
existed between criminal and victim or victim and state), and Ketchum v. Alameda
County, 811 F.2d 1243, 1247 (9th Cir. 1987) ("The prevailing rule in the circuits is
that citizens have no constitutional right to be protected by the state from attack by
private third parties, absent some special relationship between the state and the
victim or the criminal and the victim that distinguishes the victim from the general
public."), andJanan v. Trammell, 785 F.2d 557, 560 (6th Cir. 1986) (noting that
other circuits have held that absent special relationship between criminal and vic-
tim or victim and state, no due process violation can occur), and Estate of Bailey by
Oare v. County of York, 768 F.2d 503, 510-11 (3d Cir. 1985) (finding affirmative
duty on state's part where protective agency knew of abuse to specific child and
attempted to intervene, but failed to protect child), overruled by DeShaney, 489 U.S.
at 189, andJensen v. Conrad, 747 F.2d 185, 190-94 & n.ll (4th Cir. 1984) (stating
that special relationship may exist where state agency knows of abuse to particular
child), and Fox v. Custis, 712 F.2d 84, 88 (4th Cir. 1983) (stating that "duty may
arise out of special custodial or other relationships created or assumed by the state
in respect of particular persons"), and Humann v. Wilson, 696 F.2d .783, 784 (10th
Cir. 1983) (finding no section 1983 liability because state action was too remote
from crime due to lack of special relationship), with Wideman v. Shallowford Com-
munity Hosp. Inc., 826 F.2d 1030, 1034-37 (1lth Cir. 1987) (holding that special
relationship is not created outside of custody situation), and Harpole v. Arkansas
Dept. of Human Servs., 820 F.2d 923, 926-27 (8th Cir. 1987) (holding that special
relationship theory does not extend beyond "prison-like" environments), and
DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 812 F.2d 298, 301 (7th Cir.
1987) (stating that there is "no basis in the language of the due process clauses or
the principles of constitutional law for a general doctrine of 'special relation-
ship'"), affd, 489 U.S. 189 (1989), and Estate of Gilmore v. Buckley, 787 F.2d 714,
720-23 (1st Cir. 1986) (finding that, although state defendants knew of danger to
victim, special relationship should not be extended beyond custodial setting absent
mandate by Supreme Court or Congress).
38. 489 U.S. 189 (1989).
39. See id. at 193 (stating that petitioner's complaint alleged that respondents
violated victim's due process rights by failing to protect him from his father's
abuse, which they knew or should have known about).
40. See id. at 197 ("Petitioners argue that such a 'special relationship' existed
here because the State knew that Joshua faced a special danger of abuse at his
father's hands, and specifically proclaimed, by word and by deed, its intention to
protect him against that danger.").
1998]
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person is in a state's custody.4 1 The Court added in dicta, however, that
had the state created the danger that harmed the plaintiff, there would
have been a corresponding duty for the state to protect him. 42 This dicta
has been recognized by lower courts as creating a theory under which non-
custodial plaintiffs can demonstrate a violation of their constitutional
rights, namely, the state-created danger theory. 43
C. The Lower Federal Courts' Interpretation of the State-Created Danger Theory
Although the lower courts that have addressed the issue have found
the state-created danger theory to be a viable mechanism under which to
bring a section 1983 claim, the Supreme Court's lack of clarity on this
issue has led to some differences in the application of the theory among
the circuits. 44 While all circuit courts apply a standard of culpability
41. See id. at 199-200 (stating that Constitution imposes affirmative duty on
state to protect safety and well-being of those persons that state takes into custody
against their will); see also Shapiro, supra note 5, at 912 n.114 (noting that special
relationship theory is basically limited to custody situations after DeShaney); Daniel
J. Glivar, Note, Failure to Protect Witnesses: Are Prosecutors Liable?, 66 NOTRE DAME L.
REv. 1111, 1118 (1991) (noting that "absent a custodial relationship, courts gener-
ally decline to apply special relationship doctrine").
42. See DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 201 ("While the State may have been aware of the
dangers that [the victim] faced in the free world, it played no part in their crea-
tion, nor did it do anything to render him any more vulnerable to them."); see also
Eaton & Wells, supra note 2, at 107 (describing DeShaney as "the Supreme Court's
first major effort to define the scope of state and local governments' affirmative
obligations under the fourteenth amendment").
43. See Kneipp v. Tedder, 95 F.3d 1199, .1205 (3d Cir. 1996) (noting that
other circuits had utilized state-created danger theory in noncustodial situations
based on DeShaney); Uhlrig v. Harder, 64 F.3d 567, 572 n.7 (10th Cir. 1995) ("The
Supreme Court planted the seed for such a 'creation of danger' theory in explain-
ing the case of Joshua DeShaney."); see also Blum, supra note 4, at 435-36 ("[A]
number of lower federal courts confronting the question have interpreted
DeShaney to recognize a duty to protect outside the contexts of imprisonment and
involuntary confinement in public institutions."). See generally Bowers v. DeVito,
686 F.2d 616, 618 (7th Cir. 1982) (interpreting Constitution prior to DeShaney
holding, to provide affirmative duty in cases where state creates danger); White v.
Rochford, 592 F.2d 381, 384-85 (7th Cir. 1979) (finding liability under section
1983 prior to DeShaney based on state creation of danger in case where police ar-
rested driver of car, leaving three small children alone in car on busy highway).
44. See Blum, supra note 4, at 435 ("In the five years since the Supreme
Court's decision in [DeShaney] a clear consensus has yet to emerge on the criteria
for defining the circumstances that give rise to a constitutional duty of the state to
provide protection to persons from acts of private violence."). Professor Blum ob-
served that "[t]he lower courts are obviously struggling to formulate a coherent
theory for applying the 'in custody' and 'state-created danger' exceptions to
DeShaney's no-affirmative-duty rule." Id. at 471; see Eaton & Wells, supra note 2, at
110 (noting that "the Court's discussion in DeShaney of the level of state involve-
ment needed to trigger imposition of an affirmative duty is itself ambivalent and
unhelpful because it moves from one possible standard to another and then an-
other without ever choosing among them"). Professors Eaton and Wells describe
the decision in DeShaney in the following manner:
At one point the focus is on "involuntary confinement"; at another it is on
whether the plaintiff's situation is "analogous to incarceration or institu-
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greater than negligence, as required in section 1983 cases, the exact label-
ing of this standard varies from gross negligence, to recklessness, to delib-
erate or willful indifference. 45 Also, some courts require that in addition
tionalization"; and at yet another it is on whether the victim is left in a
"worse position than that in which he would have been had [the official]
not acted at all." This panoply of approaches reveals the substantial un-
certainty that remains in this area of the law, and thus highlights the need
for developing a coherent framework for analyzing affirmative duty cases.
Id. (alteration in original) (footnotes omitted) (quoting DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 199-
201 & n.9).
45. See Cornelius v. Town of Highland Lake, 880 F.2d 348, 352 (11th Cir.
1989) (noting that plaintiff asserted right not to be injured by state's gross negli-
gence and deliberate indifference, but not discussing which level of culpability was
required); Wood v. Ostrander, 879 F.2d 583, 588 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding that
"deliberate indifference" standard of culpability is required for section 1983
claims). In .Wood, a state trooper stopped a car that was being driven with its high
beams activated. See id. at 586. After arresting the driver for drunk driving, the
trooper left the female passenger, the plaintiff, alone in a high-crime area at 2:30
in the morning to find her own way home. See id. The plaintiff started to walk the
five miles to her home, but eventually accepted a ride from a stranger who drove
her to a secluded place and raped her. See id. The district court granted the de-
fendant's summary judgment motion on the basis that, although his conduct
amounted to more than mere negligence, he was entitled to good faith qualified
immunity and owed the plaintiff no "affirmative constitutional duty of protection."
Id. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the lower
court's decision in regard to the defendant's qualified immunity. See id. at 596. In
doing so, the court stated that the previous standard of culpability in the circuit
had been gross negligence, but in light of the Supreme Court's decision in City of
Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378 (1989), the standard of culpability should be height-
ened to "deliberate indifference." See id. at 588 (noting that Canton cast doubt on
sufficiency of gross negligence as requisite level of fault in section 1983 cases); see
also Uhlrig, 64 F.3d at 571 ("In order to prevail on their substantive due process
claim, Plaintiffs must demonstrate that the state acted in a manner that 'shock[s]
the conscience."'). In Uhlrig, the plaintiff was a music therapist who worked in a
state hospital. See id. at 570. Due to budgetary constraints, the hospital closed its
Adult Forensic Ward that housed high-risk patients and placed these patients in
other units with the general hospital population. See id. One of the patients who
was displaced when the Adult Forensic Ward was closed had a history of violence
that included the rape of a female patient after he had been removed from the
special unit. See id. Nevertheless, this patient remained in the general patient pop-
ulation and eventually killed the plaintiff. See id. at 571. In denying the plaintiffs
claim, the court stated that to sustain a section 1983 claim, the plaintiff must
demonstrate that the state acted in such a way as to "shock the conscience," which
she failed to do. Id. at 572. Although the Third Circuit applies the "willful disre-
gard" standard in due process cases predicated on the state-created danger theory,
the court applies the "shocks the conscience" standard in cases of high-speed po-
lice chases. See Fagan v. City of Vineland, 22 F.3d 1296, 1306 (3d Cir. 1994) (stat-
ing that in light of Supreme Court's decision in Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503
U.S. 115 (1992), "the reckless indifference of government employees is an insuffi-
cient basis upon which to ground their liability for a police pursuit under the Due
Process Clause"); Blum, supra note 4, at 471-72 ("The Supreme Court has not de-
finitively established the level of culpability that is required to make out a substan-
tive due process claim based on a failure to protect. . . . Multiple standards,
including gross negligence, recklessness, deliberate indifference, and conscience-
shocking conduct, have been articulated by the lower federal courts."); see also Ea-
ton & Wells, supra note 2, at 110 ("We contend that it is appropriate to recognize
1998]
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to a danger created by a state, there must be some connection or relation-
ship between either the state and the victim, or the state and the third
party who causes the harm.46 In addition, most circuit courts indicate that
there must be an affirmative act on the state's part that creates the danger
resulting in the harm.
47
an affirmative constitutional duty only when government inaction can be charac-
terized as an 'abuse of power."'); Watkinson, supra note 5, at 1245 (noting that
more than mere negligence is required to establish liability under section 1983).
46. See Cornelius, 880 F.2d at 354 ("In addition to the special relationship ap-
proach, a plaintiff may also show a duty on the state's part under [section] 1983 by
establishing that the plaintiff, as opposed to the general public, faced a special
danger."). In Cornelius, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Cir-
cuit used what it called a "special relationship/special danger" analysis. See id.
(noting that other circuits have followed same reasoning in section 1983 cases to
determine whether plaintiffs' constitutional rights were violated). In Cornelius,
town officials enlisted the service of local prison inmates to do work around the
community. See id. at 349. The inmates selected for the work were supposed to be
nonviolent property offenders, but prisoners with serious criminal histories partici-
pated in the program, allegedly on a regular basis and with the official's knowl-
edge. See id. at 349-50. On one of these occasions, two prisoners kidnapped the
plaintiff, who was the town clerk, and held her hostage for three days. See id. at
350. The Eleventh Circuit held that the plaintiff had a viable claim under section
1983 because "the defendants did indeed create the dangerous situation of the
inmates' presence in the community by establishing the work squad and assigning
the inmates to work around the town hall." Id. at 356; see Uhlig, 64 F.3d at 574
(holding that plaintiff must be "a member of a limited and specifically definable
group"). But seeReed v. Gardner, 986 F.2d 1122, 1127 (7th Cir. 1993) ("When the
police create a specific danger, they need not know who in particular will be hurt.
Some dangers are so evident, while their victims are so random, that state actors
can be held accountable by any injured party.").
47. See Reed, 986 F.2d at 1125 ("Inaction by the state in the face of a known
danger is not enough to trigger the obligation; according to DeShaney, the state
must have limited in some way the liberty of a citizen to act on his own behalf.");
Gregory v. City of Rogers, 974 F.2d 1006, 1011 (8th Cir. 1992) (concluding that
even if defendant knew that plaintiffs were intoxicated, defendant did not affirma-
tively place them in dangerous position); Freeman v. Ferguson, 911 F.2d 52, 55
(8th Cir. 1990) ("It is not clear, under DeShaney, how large a role the state must
play in the creation of danger and in the creation of vulnerability before it assumes
a corresponding constitutional duty to protect. It is clear, though, that at some
point such actions do create such a duty."); Ross v. United States, 910 F.2d 1422,
1431 (7th Cir. 1990) (noting that "the government's failure to provide services that
would have saved a person from injury [would not] be a constitutionally cogniza-
ble claim," but "cutting off private sources of rescue without providing a meaning-
ful alternative [would be]"); Sinthasomphone v. City of Milwaukee, 785 F. Supp.
1343, 1349 (E.D. Wis. 1992) ("In a constitutional setting that distinguishes sharply
between action and inaction, one's characterization of the misconduct alleged
under § 1983 may effectively decide the case."). In Sinthasomphone, a fourteen-year-
old victim was murdered by Jeffrey Dahmer after police found him on the street
naked and bloody and returned him to Dahmer's apartment from which he had
just escaped. See id. at 1346. Two witnesses on the scene, who had called the po-
lice, told the police that this was a child who had been drugged and abused by
Dahmer and was in need of protection. See id. Nevertheless, the police turned the
victim over to Dahmer, who claimed they were lovers, and told the witnesses that
they would be arrested if they interfered further. See id. The judge found that the
complaint stated a cognizable claim under section 1983 because it alleged that the
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D. The Third Circuit's Adoption of the State-Created Danger Theory
In a series of cases decided after DeShaney, the Third Circuit acknowl-
edged that other circuits had interpreted DeShaney as providing for a state-
created danger theory of liability under section 1983.48 The Third Circuit,
however, declined to rule on the theory's viability because the particular
facts of each case before it were not sufficient to invoke the theory.49 For
example, the court in Brown v. Grabowski50 declined to rule on the merit of
the state-created danger theory in the context of a domestic violence case
that resulted in the death of the abuse victim. 51 In a more recent case,
police did more than just fail to protect the.victim, they affirmatively acted by deliv-
ering the victim back into Dahmer's custody and preventing private citizens from
intervening. See id. at 1349-50 (noting also that "special relationship" was formed
when police took victim temporarily into custody before returning him to
Dahmer's apartment).
48. See Mark v. Borough of Hatboro, 51 F.3d 1137, 1152 (3d Cir. 1995) (not-
ing that several courts had interpreted language in DeShaney as providing for state-
created danger theory); D.R. v. Middle Bucks Area Vocational Technical Sch., 972
F.2d 1364, 1373 (3d Cir. 1992) (same); Brown v. Grabowski, 922 F.2d 1097, 1114-
15 (3d Cir. 1990) (same).
49. See Mark, 51 F.3d at 1152 (noting that Third Circuit had yet to decide
whether state-created danger theory was viable mechanism for redress of constitu-
tional injuries because, while previous cases had been analyzed under theory, none
had set of facts that met all elements of theory); DR., 972 F.2d at 1373 (acknowl-
edging that plaintiffs claim was based on state-created danger theory, but declin-
ing to determine validity of theory); Brown, 922 F.2d at 1114-16 (same).
50. 922 F.2d 1097 (3d Cir. 1990).
51. See id. at 1101 ("The facts of this case, which are essentially uncontested,
chronicle with numbing detail the disturbing inaction on the part of [the local]
Police Department that led to this tragedy."). In Brown, the administrator of the
deceased victim's estate brought a civil rights action under section 1983 against the
Roselle Police Department and individual detectives. See id. at 1103. The victim
first contacted the police after she was kidnapped by her estranged boyfriend and
held for three days during which time she was sexually and physically assaulted. See
id. at 1102. After taking a formal statement from the victim, the detectives han-
dling the case told her to return in two days at which time charges would be filed.
See id. They did not inform her of her right to obtain a restraining order, as re-
quired by state statute, and no attempt was made to arrest the abuser. See id. Two
days later, as the victim left her house to return to the police station, her estranged
boyfriend abducted her and placed her in the trunk of her car where she froze to
death. See id. at 1103.
The plaintiff argued that the defendants violated the victim's constitutional
rights by failing to assist her in gaining access to the civil courts. See id. The Third
Circuit held, however, that "[t]he due process clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment imposes upon state actors an obligation to refrain from preventing individu-
als from obtaining access to the civil courts" and "only when the state has custody
of an individual must its actors . ..provide assistance in gaining access to the
courts." Id. at 1113. In acknowledging the plaintiff's analogy to Cornelius and
Wood, the court held that the "[p]laintiff has provided no evidence to show.., that
either defendant affirmatively barred the door to the civil courts to [the victim],
that he otherwise limited her freedom to act on her own behalf, or that he created
or exacerbated the danger that [the abuser] posed to her." Id. at 1116; cf. Hynson
v. City of Chester, 864 F.2d 1026, 1027 (3d Cir. 1988) (acknowledging "growing
trend of reliance on 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to bring an action against the police alleging
that the policies used in handling domestic abuse cases violate the equal protec-
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D.R. v. Middle Bucks Area Vocational Technical School,5 2 the court again held
that the plaintiffs, students who were sexually abused during school hours,
did not satisfy the requirements of the state-created danger theory.
5 3
tion of women victims"). The court in Hynson established new requirements for
stating an equal protection claim based on the unequal treatment of domestic vio-
lence victims:
In order to survive summary judgment, a plaintiff must proffer sufficient
evidence that would allow a reasonable jury to infer that it is the policy or
custom of the police to provide less protection to victims of domestic vio-
lence than to other victims of violence, that discrimination against wo-
men was a motivating factor, and that the plaintiff was injured by the
policy or custom.
Id. at 1031; see Coffman v. Wilson Police, 739 F. Supp. 257, 264 (E.D. Pa. 1990)
(holding that, in domestic violence cases, protective orders issued by state court
pursuant to authority under state law create constitutionally protected property
interest in police protection). In Coffman, the plaintiff did not utilize the state-
created danger theory, but posited that defendants deprived her of "entitlement to
police protection under the Protection From Abuse Act and therefore violated her
rights under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United
States Constitution." Id. at 260. After obtaining a restraining order against her ex-
husband, the victim continued to be harassed and threatened. See id. at 259-60.
Although the victim complained to the police and filed a contempt petition, noth-
ing was done and she was eventually shot by her ex-husband. See id. at 260. The
district court held that the plaintiff could not have sustained her claim under
either the special relationship or state-created danger theory, but that this was "a
different source of due process protection" and that "property interests created by
state law were protectable by the Due Process Clause." Id. at 263. The court held
that the court order granting the restraining order created a property interest in
which the plaintiff had a legitimate claim of entitlement warranting due process
protection. See id. at 264. Compare Pinder v. Johnson, 54 F.3d 1169, 1175-76 (4th
Cir. 1995) (finding that police officer's assurances to domestic violence victim that
her ex-boyfriend would remain in jail and that it was safe for her to go to work did
not amount to affirmative action; therefore, state was not liable when victim's ex-
boyfriend was released that night and burned down her house, killing her chil-
dren), and Losinki v. County of Trempealeau, 946 F.2d 544, 550-51 (7th Cir. 1991)
(holding that liability under state-created danger theory did not attach in case
where domestic violence victim was accompanied by police officer for protection
while she went to her house to retrieve her belongings and was shot by her hus-
band while doing so), and Brown, 922 F.2d at 1116 (holding that domestic violence
victim failed to meet state-created danger theory requirements), and Balistreri v.
Pacifica Police Dept., 901 F.2d 696, 700 (9th Cir. 1990) (rejecting due process
claim based on failure to enforce restraining order in domestic violence case be-
cause there was no allegation that state actors had affirmatively placed abuse victim
in danger), with Freeman, 911 F.2d at 55 (recognizing state-created danger theory in
domestic violence case where victim had restraining order against her estranged
husband, but police chief, who was friend of ex-husband, told police officers not to
respond to reports that victim was being harassed and threatened).
52. 972 F.2d 1364 (3d Cir. 1992).
53. See id. at 1376 (holding that student plaintiffs failed to show that their
school had violated their constitutional rights by creating or exacerbating risk of
harm caused by fellow students). The Third Circuit first analyzed the issue of af-
firmative duties to school children in the companion cases Stoneking v. Bradford
Area School District, 856 F.2d 594 (3d Cir. 1988) [hereinafter Stoneking I], vacated sub
nom. Smith v. Stoneking, 489 U.S. 1062 (1989), and Stoneking v. Bradford Area School
District, 882 F.2d 720 (3d Cir. 1989) [hereinafter Stoneking Il]. In these cases, a
female high school student was sexually abused and forced to engage in sexual acts
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by the high school band director. See Stoneking , 856 F.2d at 595. Although the
principal of the school was made aware of this and other incidents involving the
band director and other female students, no action was taken. See id.
In Stoneking I, the court stated that because of state truancy laws, students are
in a sense forced to go to school creating a "functional custody" situation. See id. at
601-03 ("There is thus an adequate basis from the Pennsylvania child abuse report-
ing and in loco parentis statutes, coupled with the broad common law duty owed by
school officials to students, to conclude there was a desire on the part of the state
to provide affirmative protection to students."). Based on the Supreme Court's
holding in Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277 (1980), the Third Circuit held that
because this particular victim was distinguishable from the public-at-large, a special
relationship existed between her and the school officials. See Stoneking I, 856 F.2d
at 600-01. This, coupled with the functional custodial setting, gave rise to an af-
firmative duty on the part of the school officials to protect the student. See id. at
601.
The Supreme Court later vacated Stoneking I and remanded the case for fur-
ther consideration in light of its then recent decision in DeShaney. See Stoneking II,
882 F.2d at 721. On remand, the Third Circuit concluded that:
In light of the Supreme Court's discussion in DeShaney distinguishing be-
tween affirmative duties of care and protection imposed by a state on its
agents and constitutional duties to protect, we can no longer rely on the
statutory and common law duties imposed in Pennsylvania on school offi-
cials as the basis of a duty to protect students from harm occurring as a
result of a third person.
Id. at 723. The court debated whether the functional custody situation was still
viable after DeShaney, but finally decided not to rely on this as a basis for affirmative
duties because "the uncertainty of the law in this respect may [have] cause [d] fur-
ther delay." Id. at 724. Instead, the court based its holding on the policy adopted
by the school officials:
Thus, to the extent that the Supreme Court's remand of this case in light
of DeShaney required us to consider whether Stoneking still may maintain a
viable section 1983 claim if there is no predicate duty by defendants to
protect her, we hold that she may because she has also alleged that de-
fendants, with deliberate indifference to the consequences, established
and maintained a policy, practice or custom which directly caused her
constitutional harm.
Id. at 725.
In D.R, the plaintiffs were female students who were physically and sexually
assaulted by male classmates. See D.R, 972 F.2d at 1366. Although school officials
were advised of this conduct, nothing was done to address the situation. See id. In
their complaint, plaintiffs alleged liability based on the existence of a special custo-
dial relationship between the victims and defendants and, alternatively, because
the defendants "creat[ed] a danger that resulted in a violation of plaintiffs' consti-
tutional rights under the Fourteenth Amendment." Id. at 1368.
The court resolved, the question left open by Stoneking H as to whether a
school environment could be considered a custodial setting sufficient to trigger an
affirmative duty, concluding that it was not. See id. at 1370-71. The court con-
trasted the school setting with the prison and institutional settings on the basis that
the latter two provided "full time severe and continuous state restriction." Id. at
1371. In contrast to prison and institutional settings, parents have the option of
sending their children to private or public schools, and children leave the school
every day and are in contact with countless people on the "outside" from whom
they can obtain assistance. See id.
Using the state-created danger theory, the plaintiffs claimed that the school
officials placed the classroom under the supervision of an incompetent student
teacher and failed to investigate the situation and report the abuse to parents. See
id. at 1373. The court concluded that "[a]s in Brown, however, the facts alleged in
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Therefore, the court did not address the theory's viability in that case
either.
54
Although the Third Circuit analyzed the state-created danger theory
more closely in Mark v. Borough of Hatboro,55 it again declined to address
the theory's viability.56 The plaintiff in Mark alleged that the local fire
company's policy of not screening its applicant pool for potential arsonists
led to a violation of his constitutional rights when his business was burned
down by a firefighter.57 The Third Circuit reviewed cases that centered
around the state-created danger theory and identified four elements that
are required to prove a constitutional violation under the theory: 1) fore-
seeable and fairly direct harm to the victim; 2) willful disregard of the
harm on the state's part; 3) a relationship between the state and the vic-
tim; and 4) use of state authority to create the dangerous situation that led
to the victim's harm. 58 The court did not rule on the viability of the the-
ory itself, however, because it found that the plaintiff failed to satisfy these
plaintiffs' amended complaints differ in important respects from those in the state-
created danger line of cases." Id. at 1374. In finding the theory inapplicable, the
court seemed to emphasize the absence of any affirmative acts on the state's part;
however, it relied more on the fact that the harm was not a foreseeable outcome of
the state's act or omissions. See id. ("The school defendants' 'acts' . .. may have
created a recognizable risk that plaintiffs would receive little education in that
class, and perhaps, physical injury due to the roughhousing. Plaintiffs did not suf-
fer harm, however, from that kind of foreseeable risk."); Blum, supra note 4, at 459-
60 ("The court's conclusion that no duty to protect existed in D. ... appeared to
rest not on the lack of the defendants' affirmative acts, but rather on the perceived
unrelatedness between the defendants' acts and the plaintiffs' harm."); see also Doe
v. Methacton Sch. Dist., 880 F. Supp. 380, 386 (E.D. Pa. 1995) (dismissing state-
created danger claim on basis that, although all young girls in school district were
foreseeable victims of pedophile teacher, this was not sufficiently specific).
54. See D.A, 972 F.2d at 1373-76 (reviewing state-created danger cases from
other circuits, but failing to explicitly adopt theory as mechanism for proving liabil-
ity in Third Circuit); see also Mark v. Borough of Hatboro, 51 F.3d 1137, 1152
(3d Cir. 1995) ("In [D.K], while we analyzed the plaintiffs' claims under the state-
created danger theory, we consistently referred to the claim as 'plaintiffs' theory,'
only going so far as to acknowledge that other courts have recognized the
theory.").
55. 51 F.3d 1137 (3d Cir. 1995).
56. See id. at 1152 (examining cases from other circuits that adopted state-
created danger theory and enumerating four common elements present in each
case).
57. See id. at 113940 (noting that complaint contended that fire company
should have screened applicant pool for arsonists).
58. See id. at 1152 (enumerating would-be factors in state-created danger the-
ory test). The elements identified by the court were:
(1) the harm ultimately caused was foreseeable and fairly direct; (2) the
state actor acted in willful disregard for the safety of the plaintiff;
(3) there existed some relationship between the state and the plaintiff;
(4) the state actors used their authority to create an opportunity that
otherwise would not have existed for the third party's crime to occur.
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elements. 59
Three years later, in Kneipp, the Third Circuit finally adopted the
state-created danger theory as a viable mechanism for bringing claims
under section 1983 after finding that the plaintiff satisfied all four ele-
ments of the test.60 In Kneipp, the plaintiff was stopped by police as she
walked home with her husband from a bar.61 The court found that she
was visibly intoxicated and was relying on her husband's assistance to get
home safely. 62 After interrogating both the plaintiff and her husband, the
police allowed the plaintiffs husband to go home first and then sent the
plaintiff home alone. 63 Although she was less than one block from her
apartment, the plaintiff never made it home, but was found unconscious
in a ditch a few hours later.6 4
The court held that the plaintiff presented a prima facie case on
which a jury could reasonably conclude that her constitutional rights had
been violated.65 Unlike Mark, this case presented a situation in which the
risk of injury was to a discrete plaintiff, as opposed to the public-at-large. 6 6
59. See id. *(finding that municipality did not create danger posed by arsonist
and that victim did not face any greater danger than public-at-large). The court
stated:
After undertaking a thorough review of our caselaw touching upon the
underlying constitutional violation in a Monell/Collins case, we have found
language in the cases supporting and opposing the existence of a state-
created danger theory. Perhaps at some point we will have to harmonize
our cases. But we have not reached that day, because even assuming that
a plaintiff can state a constitutional violation based on the state-created
danger theory, there can be no liability in this case.
Id.
60. See Kneipp v. Tedder, 95 F.3d 1199, 1201 (3d Cir. 1996) (holding that
state-created danger theory is viable mechanism for proving liability under section
1983 after concluding that plaintiff was foreseeable victim of danger created di-
rectly by state actors in willful disregard of plaintiffs safety).
61. See id.
62. See id. (noting that plaintiff was unable to stand by herself during police
interrogation and was leaning on police car). Both the plaintiff and her husband
were intoxicated, but the plaintiff was extremely inebriated, smelled of urine and
needed her husband's assistance to walk. See id.
63. See id. One of the defendant police officers who stopped the two for caus-
ing a disturbance admitted later that he knew they were both intoxicated. See id.
Nonetheless, the officer sent the plaintiff's husband home first to relieve their ba-
bysitter and allowed the plaintiff to leave a little while later by herself. See id. at
1202.
64. See id. As a result of her exposure to the cold, the plaintiff suffered hy-
pothermia and anoxia (defined as lack of oxygen to the brain), which caused per-
manent brain damage. See id. at 1203; see also Slobodzian, supra note 9, at BI
(noting that Samantha Kneipp is now practically blind, speech-impaired, cannot
walk or sit upright, has lost bladder and bowel control, is unable to swallow and is
fed through tube inserted into her stomach).
65. See Kneipp, 95 F.3d at 1201 (finding that plaintiff met elements of test).
For a further discussion of how the plaintiff in Kneipp met all of the elements of the
state-created danger test, see infra note 67 and accompanying text.
66. See Kneipp, 95 F.3d at 1209 & n.22 (holding that relationship requirement
of test was met because there was requisite contact between plaintiff and state actor
1998] CASEBRIEF 963
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Applying the test set forth in Mark, the Third Circuit held that: 1) in the
plaintiffs intoxicated condition, it was foreseeable that harm would befall
her if left to walk home unaccompanied; 2) the officer acted in willful
disregard of the plaintiff's safety because he knew that she was intoxicated
and incapacitated, but he let her walk home unattended; 3) a relationship
existed between the officer and the plaintiff in that the officer exercised
sufficient control over the plaintiff by stopping her in the course of her
journey home; and 4) this affirmative act of intervention on the officer's
part interrupted the assistance that the plaintiff was receiving from her
husband, thereby increasing the risk of danger to her.67 While the Kneipp
holding established the state-created danger theory as a basis for liability
in the Third Circuit, the elements of the theory were not completely solidi-
fied at that time, as evidenced by the court's further modification of the
test in Morse.
68
III. FACTS AND NARRATIVE ANALYSIS OF
MoRsE v. Lo WR MERION ScHooL DISTRICT
In Morse, the Third Circuit once again applied the test articulated in
Mark and applied in Kneipp, but concluded that the plaintiff failed to state
a claim based on a modified version of the test.69 In Morse, the suit was
initiated by the murder of Diane Morse, a preschool teacher, who was shot
and killed in front of her classroom of children by a neighborhood resi-
dent who had a history of mental illness. 70 The perpetrator, Arcelia
Stovall, gained access to the school through a back entrance that was left
unlocked to facilitate construction work in progress around the school at
the time of the incident.7 1 According to the complaint, the defendant
so as to make plaintiff foreseeable victim).
67. See id. at 1208-09 (finding that plaintiff met elements of state-created dan-
ger test).
68. See Morse v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 908 (3d Cir. 1997)
(modifying elements of state-created danger theory as previously adopted in
Kneipp).
69. See id. at 907 (holding that at least three out of four requirements of test
were not met).
70. See id. at 904 (noting that woman who shot Diane Morse was subsequently
convicted of her murder and placed in psychiatric hospital). The Ardmore Child
Care Center where Diane Morse worked is owned and operated by the Daycare
Association of Montgomery County and is located in a wing of Lower Merion High
School. See id.
71. See id. On the day that Diane Morse was shot, and for several weeks prior,
the back doors of the high school had been left unlocked and even propped open
to facilitate construction that was going on around the school. See id. Unfortu-
nately, this also facilitated the entry of Arcelia Stovall, who shot Diane Morse. See
id.; see also Nancy Lawson et al., Day-care Teacher Slain as Class Watches, PHILA. IN-
QUIRER, July 29, 1994, at Al [hereinafter Lawson et al., Teacher Slain] (quoting
relative of deceased who observed that "[a] ny stranger could come off the street at
any time and walk through those hallways"); Julia C. Martinez, Family of Slain
Teacher Sues Over Open Door, PHILA. INQUIRER, June 27, 1996, at B3 ("According to
[Morse's] suit, workers.., were performing work inside or outside the school and
[Vol. 43: p. 947
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school district violated its own written policy that required that all side and
back entrances to the school remain locked. 72 As a result, the plaintiff
alleged, the environment created by the defendants was dangerous and
was known by them to be dangerous, and it created the opportunity for
harm to occur to Diane Morse.
73
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Penn-
sylvania, in dismissing the complaint, held that according to Kneipp and
other cases predicated on section 1983: 1) failure to act or an omission will
not suffice, and the state must affirmatively act to create the danger; and
2) a plaintiff must allege that he or she faced a particular danger that
resulted in harm.7 4 The Third Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the com-
plaint, but disagreed with the district court's analysis of the state-created
danger theory. 75 Like the district court, the Third Circuit found that the
harm to the plaintiff was not a reasonably direct and foreseeable result of
the defendant's actions.76 Because the harm was not foreseeable, the
were allowed to enter and exit it through a door that was left unlocked, contrary to
safety rules.").
72. See Morse, 132 F.3d at 904. But seeJennifer Wing, Fatal Shooting Has Altered
Montco Day Care's Routine, PHILA. INQUIRER, Mar. 30, 1995, at MD2 (quoting execu-
tive director of Day Care Association of Montgomery County as saying, "We had
been an open building for 18 years. Nobody would have thought a situation like
that would have happened.").
73. See Morse, 132 F.3d at 904 (discussing plaintiffs allegations).
74. See id. at 906 (noting that district court dismissed complaint because plain-
tiff did not allege that victim faced particular danger distinct from others inside
school at time of incident); see also Mark v. Borough of Hatboro, 51 F.3d 1137,
1153 (3d Cir. 1995) (stating that plaintiff did not face danger greater than public-
at-large); Doe v. Methacton Sch. Dist., 880 F. Supp. 380, 386 (E.D. Pa. 1995) (dis-
missing state-created danger claim on basis that, although all young girls in school
district were foreseeable victims of pedophile teacher, this was not sufficiently
specific).
In dismissing the suit, the district judge in Morse stated that "not maintaining
tight security or not detaining Stovall while she was loitering days earlier were fail-
ures to act by the school and day care, but they were not affirmative acts and there-
fore not actionable by the section of the civil rights law under which the suit was
brought." Julia C. Martinez, In Classroom Murder, Suit is Dismissed, PHILA. INQUIRER,
Nov. 23, 1996, at B2.
75. See Morse, 132 F.3d at 904 (analyzing relationship prong of state-created
danger theory somewhat differently than district court).
76. See id. at 908 (holding that "defendants ... could not have foreseen that
allowing construction workers to use an unlocked back entrance for access to the
school building would result in the murderous act of a mentally unstable third
party, and that the tragic harm which ultimately befell Diane Morse was too attenu-
ated ... to support liability"). The Third Circuit bolstered this conclusion by not-
ing that not only were the defendants unaware of Stovall's violent propensities, but
there was "no allegation that defendants were aware of anyone posing a credible
threat of violence to persons inside the school building." Id. In addition, there
was not a direct causal link between the violent attack of the third party and the
defendant's action. See id. at 909 (stating that, if there was any causation, it was too
attenuated); see also Wing, supra note 72, at MD2 (quoting executive director of
daycare association as saying, "You can only do so much without completely closing
the facility in .... If someone is clearly intent on doing harm to another person,
1998] CASEBRIEF 965
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court also found that the defendant had not acted in "willful disregard" of
plaintiffs safety; thus, the second element of the test was not met. 7 7
In its analysis, however, the court disagreed with the district court's
interpretation of "discrete plaintiff" to mean a specific plaintiff.78
Stressing that the crucial factor in the analysis is foreseeability, the court
stated that the relationship element of the test does not require the state
to know that it is creating a risk of danger to a specific plaintiff.79 Instead,
the court interpreted this element to mean that a state must create a dan-
and if they are as disturbed as this woman appears to have been, I don't know what
measures could have been taken").
The motive for Stovall's action was not readily apparent to police and those
who knew the two women, thus diminishing the argument that it should have been
foreseen by the defendants. See Greg McCullough, Trial Ahead in Day-Care Shooting,
PHILA. INQUIRER, Sept. 7, 1994, at BI (noting that Stovall claimed to have acted out
of revenge). In a sworn statement made by Stovall after the shooting, she told Sgt.
Mark Keenan that she intended to kill Morse because Morse had beaten Stovall's
mother and injured her knee. See id. However, Stovall's mother, who was later
interviewed, said that this never happened. See id. (noting that defendant's mother
did not validate her daughter's story). Also, although the two women lived within
four blocks of each other, they had not been in contact for some time. See Nancy
Lawson, Authorities Look for a Motive in Day-Care Shooting, PHILA. INQUIRER, July 30,
1994, at B1 [hereinafter Lawson, Authorities Look for Motive] (noting that, according
to victim's husband, victim had discontinued her friendship with Stovall years
before "because [Stovall's] imagination is just bizarre"). Morse's husband "specu-
lated that the seeds of the confrontation lay in an argument" the two women had
15 years before the shooting: "Trudy thought Diane was messing with a (boy-
friend) of both of theirs, but Diane denied it all .... I guess Trudyjust kept it in
her mind all these years." Lawson et al., Teacher Slain, supra note 71, at Al. Ac-
cording to the police, Stovall felt "like she was wronged over the last several years
[prior to the shooting], but it's been a one-sided feud." Id.
Although everyone was shocked by the killing, Stovall's mental illness was less
of a surprise to members of the community where she lived. See id. (noting that
Stovall was known for her "strange behavior," including once trying to set someone
on fire in neighborhood bar). Neighbors of Stovall, however, maintain that in the
days before the shooting, Stovall was "playing ball in the street with her neighbor's
children, weeding her mother's garden, and shopping at the local five and dime."
Lawson, Authorities Look for Motive, supra, at Bi.
77. See Morse, 132 F.3d at 909 (stating that deliberate indifference standard
requires that danger or harm must at least be foreseeable); Kneipp v. Tedder, 95
F.3d 1199, 1208 n.21 (3d Cir. 1996) (stating that defendant must have known envi-
ronment was dangerous);Johnson v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 38 F.3d 198, 201 (5th
Cir. 1995) (using deliberate indifference standard of culpability); Leffal v. Dallas
Indep. Sch. Dist., 28 F.3d 521, 531 (5th Cir. 1994) (noting that degree of culpabil-
ity is essential element to theory).
78. See Morse, 132 F.3d at 913 (analyzing foreseeable plaintiff prong of state-
created danger test differently than district court); Reed v. Gardner, 986 F.2d
1122, 1127 (7th Cir. 1993) (finding that passengers of cars on highway at particu-
lar time constituted foreseeable class of victims for purpose of holding state liable
for putting drunk driver behind wheel of car).
79. See Morse, 132 F.3d at 912 (expanding relationship requirement to include
class of persons, as opposed to just particular individuals, as long as harm to per-
sons in class is foreseeable).
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ger to either a specific person or a specific class of persons.8 0
Finally, emphasizing the importance of foreseeability under the the-
ory, the court seemingly eliminated the need to characterize the state's
conduct as an act as opposed to an omission.8 1 The court noted that it is
not clear whether the theory mandates an affirmative act and, if so, what
constitutes an affirmative act.82 The court concluded that the dispositive
factor is whether the defendant put the plaintiff in a foreseeably dangerous
position rather than whether the action constituted an act as opposed to
an omission. 83
IV. THE TEST: MEASURING THE DANGER, DETECTING THE SIGNS
A. Foreseeable and Fairly Direct Harm
In Kneipp, the court reasoned that the police officer knew the plaintiff
was highly intoxicated and that it was a cold night and, therefore, the vic-
tim's accident was the foreseeable and direct result of the officer's inter-
ference with the victim's husband's attempt to get her home.84 By
contrast, the plaintiffs in Morse did not allege that the defendant knew of
the danger that Stovall posed to the victim, nor was the access to the
school clearly the direct cause of Stovall's attack on Diane Morse. 85 Thus,
80. See id. (noting that, under certain fact patterns, state-created danger could
foreseeably cause harm to discrete group of persons, therefore making it appropri-
ate to impose liability on state actors when harm befalls one or more members of
group).
81. See id. at 914 (noting that what constitutes act in one situation is not char-
acterized as act in different situation); see also DeShaney v. Winnebago County
Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 204 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (stating
that "[in a constitutional setting that distinguishes sharply between action and
inaction, one's characterization of the misconduct alleged under 1983 may effec-
tively decide the case"); Blum, supra note 4, at 464 (emphasizing "the confusion
engendered by any theory that turns 'on the tenuous metaphysical construct which
differentiates sins of omission and commission"' (quoting White v. Rochford, 592
F.2d 381, 384 (7th Cir. 1979))).
82. See Morse, 132 F.3d at 914 (stating that affirmative act may not be crucial
element of test); see also Bowers v. DeVito, 686 F.2d 616, 618 (7th Cir. 1982) (not-
ing difficulty in distinguishing between act and omission for section 1983 pur-
poses). Compare Wood v. Ostrander, 879 F.2d 583, 589-90 (9th Cir. 1989) (finding
that by arresting driver and leaving passenger to find her own way home, police
officer affirmatively placed victim in danger), with Gregory v. City of Rogers, 974
F.2d 1006, 1011 (8th Cir. 1992) (finding that police did not affirmatively create
danger in situation where driver was arrested and intoxicated passengers were left
unattended in car outside and eventually drove away and were involved in
accident).
83. See Morse, 132 F.3d at 915 (noting that issue of whether state-created dan-
ger theory requires affirmative act as opposed to omission was resolved in Mark v.
Borough of Hatboro, 51 F.3d 1137 (3d Cir. 1995)).
84. See Kneipp v. Tedder, 95 F.3d 1199, 1209 (3d Cir. 1996) (stating that,
absent police intervention, it is conceivable that victim would have been safely es-
corted home by her husband).
85. See Morse, 132 F.3d at 908 (noting three reasons why attack on victim was
not direct and foreseeable); Melissa Dribben, A Litigious Reply to Pupils'Pain, PHILA.
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the court's analysis of the first element of the test is consistent in both
cases.8 6 Because the facts in Morse were sufficiently different, it enabled
the court to draw a line between what is foreseeable for purposes of the
state-created danger theory and what is not foreseeable.
8 7
B. Acting in Willful Disregard
In Kneipp, the Third Circuit employed a "willful disregard" standard
for the culpability element of the test.8 8 The court declined to distinguish
this term from the "deliberate indifference" terminology used by other
courts, but elaborated by saying that because the officer knew the plaintiff
was incapacitated, his actions amounted to willful disregard.8 9 In Morse,
the court did not define the standard with any more clarity, but stated that
the actor must demonstrate a willingness to ignore a foreseeable risk to
the victim.90 Therefore, the foreseeability factor appears in the second
INQUIRER, Apr. 3, 1995, at BI ("[I]t's hard to believe that a locked door and a sign
warning 'Visitors Must Go to the Office' would have deterred a woman such as
Stovall.... [P]olice say [Stovall] was motivated out of vengeance for a perceived
slight during an argument she'd had with Morse 15 years earlier.").
86. Compare Kneipp, 95 F.3d at 1208 (holding that plaintiffs injuries were fore-
seeable because police officer knew that she was intoxicated and incapacitated
when he sent her home alone), with Morse, 132 F.3d at 910 (holding that defend-
ants did not know of violent propensities of third party).
87. See Morse, 132 F.3d at 909 (noting that finding liability in this case under
state-created danger theory would stretch concepts of foreseeability and causation
too far). In Morse, the harm was not foreseeable because the school district did not
have any indication that Stovall was mentally ill or that she had any intention of
harming Morse. See McCullough, supra note 76, at Bi (stating that police had
difficulty discerning motivation for murder).
88. See Kneipp, 95 F.3d at 1208 n.21 ("In the past, we have declined to distin-
guish terms such as 'deliberate indifference,' 'reckless indifference,' 'gross negli-
gence,' or 'reckless disregard' in the context of a violation of substantive due
process under the Fourteenth Amendment.") (citing Williams v. Borough of West
Chester, 891 F.2d 458, 464 n.10 (3d Cir. 1989)). The Kneipp court distinguished
between the "willful disregard" standard employed in state-created danger cases
and the "shocks the conscience" standard used by the Third Circuit to assess
whether high-speed police chases violate victims' constitutional due process rights.
See id. at 1207 ("We believe that the ... shocks the conscience standard is limited
to police pursuit cases, and accordingly, we are not bound to follow that standard
in the case before us.").
89. See id. (noting that because police officer knew of victim's incapacity and
harm was foreseeable, his actions amounted to willful disregard for her safety); see
also Barbara Kritchevsky, Making Sense of State of Mind: Determining Responsibility in
Section 1983 Municipal Liability Litigation, 60 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 417, 470 n.279
(1992) (observing that there is apparently no real distinction among indifference,
recklessness, wantonness and willfulness).
90. See Morse, 132 F.3d at 910 (noting that defendant must be aware of fore-
seeable risk to meet culpability requirement). Actually, the court seemed to treat
the terms "willful disregard" and "deliberate indifference" as synonymous, stating
that the second prong of the test requires a determination that "the state actor
acted with willful disregard for or deliberate indifference to plaintiffs safety." Id.;
seeJohnson v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 38 F.3d 198, 201 (5th Cir. 1994) (employing
deliberate indifference standard of culpability); see also Eaton & Wells, supra note
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element of the test as well, because it is foreseeability that elevates the
culpability from mere negligence to a willful disregard for the victim's
welfare. 9
1
C. Relationship Between State and Plaintiff" A Specific Plaintiff Versus a
Class of Plaintiffs
As in the first two parts of the test, the element of foreseeability is
crucial to the relationship requirement of the test.9 2 The relationship re-
quirement is not merely an extension of the direct causal requirement,
but instead ensures that the defendant had sufficient contact with the vic-
tim so as to make the harm resulting from his or her actions foreseeable.9 3
Based on the facts and language of Kneipp and Mark, the district court
in Morse interpreted the relationship requirement to mean that the harm
must be foreseeable to the specific victim. 94 On appeal, however, the
Third Circuit stated that this is not necessarily true because, under the
state-created danger theory, there is apparently only a minor distinction, if
any, between a discrete plaintiff and a discrete class of plaintiffs.9 5 The
court, however, did not decide whether this element was met in Morse be-
cause the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate the other three requirements. 9 6
Nevertheless, the court appeared to indicate its willingness to broaden the
interpretation of foreseeable plaintiff to include classes of plaintiffs as long
2, at 111 ("In keeping with both settled authority and widely accepted notions of
justice, a standard of 'deliberate indifference' is an appropriate measure of
whether a particular instance of government inaction fairly may be characterized
as abusive.").
91. See Morse, 132 F.3d at 910 (emphasizing foreseeability factor by adding
that "the notion of deliberate indifference contemplates a danger that must at
least be foreseeable").
92. See Kneipp, 95 F.3d at 1209 n.22 (distinguishing relationship requirement
of special relationship theory from that of state-created danger theory). In Kneipp,
the court concluded that "[tihe relationship requirement under the state-created
danger theory contemplates some contact such that the plaintiff was a foreseeable
victim of the defendant's acts in a tort sense." Id.
93. See Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277, 285 (1980) (emphasizing lack of
foreseeability because plaintiff was indistinguishable from public-at-large).
94. See Morse, 132 F.3d at 904 (noting district court's interpretation of rela-
tionship requirement).
95. See id. at 914 (stating that "there seems to be no principled distinction
between a discrete plaintiff and a discrete class of plaintiffs"); see also Uhlrig v.
Harder, 64 F.3d 567, 574 (10th Cir. 1995) (stating that plaintiff must be part of
definable group); Reed v. Gardner, 986 F.2d 1122, 1127 (7th Cir. 1993) ("When
the police create a specific danger, they need not know who in particular will be
hurt. Some dangers are so evident, while their victims are so random, that state
actors can be held accountable by any injured party.").
96. See Morse, 132 F.3d at 914 (noting that it was not easy question to deter-
mine if victim and all others present at high school were sufficiently discrete group
to be considered foreseeable victims, but that it need not be decided because
other elements of test were not satisfied).
19981
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as the foreseeability element is met. 97
D. Creation of Danger
The Kneipp court concluded that a reasonable jury could find that,
but for the intervention of the police who prevented the plaintiff's hus-
band from taking her home and the officer's decision to send her home
alone, the plaintiff would not have been harmed.98 Therefore, according
to the court, it was the affirmative acts of the police that created the fore-
seeable harm. 99 The Morse court expounded on this element of the test by
noting that the state action does not necessarily have to be an "act," but
instead may be characterized as an "omission." 10 0 The important factor is
whether the state created the opportunity for a foreseeable harm to
occur.
10
'
Although it was not necessary for the Morse court to determine
whether omissions are included in the fourth requirement of the state-
created danger theory, this dicta is important because it allows a broader
range of state conduct to be brought under scrutiny. 10 2 No longer does
the state have to affirmatively act to create the danger; instead, inaction
may be enough, as long as the omission was deliberate and the harm was
foreseeable. 10 3
97. See id. (noting that law is not uniform on issue of whether discrete plaintiff
may be discrete class of plaintiffs). Compare Uhrig, 64 F.3d at 574 (allowing for
discrete class of plaintiffs in state-created danger cases), and Reed, 986 F.2d at 1127
(same), with Cornelius v. Town of Highland Lake, 880 F.2d 348, 354 (11th Cir.
1989) (requiring special relationship between state and victim in addition to crea-
tion of danger).
98. See Kneipp v. Tedder, 95 F.3d 1199, 1209 (3d Cir. 1996) (noting that vic-
tim was in worse position after police intervened and but for this action victim
conceivably would have made it home with her husband's assistance).
99. See id. (stating that affirmative acts of police officers increased danger or
risk of injury to victim).
100. See Morse, 132 F.3d at 915 ("Thus, the dispositive factor appears to be
whether the state has in some way placed the plaintiff in a dangerous position that
was foreseeable, and not whether the act was more appropriately characterized as
an affirmative act or an omission.").
101. See id. at 914 ("The ultimate test is one of foreseeability.").
102. See id. at 915 (indicating that state actors can create dangerous situation
through either acts or omissions).
103. See id. (noting that issue of whether act rather than omission is necessary
was answered in Mark); see also Mark v. Borough of Hatboro, 51 F.3d 1137, 1152
(3d Cir. 1995) (stating that state-created danger theory applies when states "use[ ]
their authority to create an opportunity that otherwise would not have existed for
the third party's crime to occur"); Blum, supra note 4, at 435 ("[A] duty to protect
should be recognized when the state, by affirmative acts or sins of omission, creates
or enhances the risk of harm [and] less emphasis should be placed on the affirma-
tive nature of the state's acts, while rigorous scrutiny should be given to ... causa-
tion and culpability."). Compare Reed v. Gardner, 986 F.2d 1122, 1126 (7th Cir.
1993) (finding affirmative creation of danger where state actor arrested sober
driver and allowed drunk passenger to get behind wheel), and Wood v. Ostrander,
879 F.2d 583, 590 (9th Cir. 1989) (finding affirmative creation of danger where
state actor arrested driver of car, had car impounded and left victim alone in high-
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CASEBRIEF
V. WHAT THE SIGNS MEAN
Essentially, the crucial element in a section 1983 case premised on the
state-created danger theory is foreseeability.10 4 The Third Circuit has
seemingly provided leeway to plaintiffs by broadening the definition of
discrete plaintiff to include a discrete class of plaintiffs and by declining to
distinguish conduct as either acts or omissions, however, this does not nec-
essarily impose an increased obligation on states to protect their citizens'
constitutional rights. 10 5 No longer does a plaintiff have to artfully argue
that state conduct constitutes an act as opposed to an omission, or to dis-
tinguish himself or herself as the specific target of the harm.10 6 The plain-
tiff must adequately illustrate, however, a causal link between state
involvement and the resulting danger as well as the foreseeability of the
harm, which is crucial in establishing each of the requirements.10 7
Despite the Third Circuit's attempt to clarify the test, there is still
room to draw fine lines and distinctions on the issue of foreseeability. 10 8
This is evidenced by the fact that although the court professes to be in
agreement with the other circuits as to the nature of the theory, cases with
similar fact patterns have resulted in contradictory holdings. 10 9 There-
crime area), with Gregory v. City of Rogers, 974 F.2d 1006, 1011-12 (8th Cir. 1992)
(finding no liability in case where state actor had driver of car go inside police
station, leaving two intoxicated passengers in running car outside station).
104. See Morse, 132 F.3d at 914 (stating that "ultimate test is one of
foreseeability").
105. See id. at 913 (noting that state-created danger theory imposes no duty on
states to protect general public); see also Eaton & Wells, supra note 2, at 142 ("Con-
ditioning an affirmative duty on some threshold level of state involvement affords
government the leeway to preserve its discretion in allocating resources, while still
rendering it accountable for abusive inaction.").
106. See Morse, 132 F.3d at 915 (stating that important element is foreseeabil-
ity and distinction between act and omission is not crucial in determining whether
state created danger); see also Sinthasomphone v. City of Milwaukee, 785 F. Supp.
1343, 1347 (E.D. Wis. 1992) ("The legal difficulties posed by [state-created dan-
ger] cases are immediately apparent to anyone with even a passing familiarity with
federal civil rights litigation. The genius of the . . . complaint in trying to avoid
those difficulties is also apparent.").
107. See Morse, 132 F.3d at 908 (stating that first element of state-created dan-
ger theory is that "the harm ultimately caused was a foreseeable and a fairly direct
result of the state's actions"); see also Blum, supra note 4, at 439 (suggesting that in
state-created danger cases "less emphasis should be placed on the affirmative na-
ture of the state's acts while rigorous scrutiny should be given to the factors of
causation and culpability. The latter factors better determine the ultimate finding
of a breach of duty and the imposition of constitutional liability") (footnotes
omitted).
108. See Heather v. Indiana Area Sch. Dist., 985 F.2d 707, 715 (3d Cir. 1993)
(Scirica, J., concurring) (recognizing that courts "must draw lines to refine the
state action requirement and the special relationship of care developed in
DeShaney"); Blum, supra note 4, at 471 ("A review of recent cases reveals the fine
lines and distinctions courts are drawing.").
109. Compare Reed v. Gardner, 986 F.2d 1122, 1126 (7th Cir. 1993) (finding
state-created danger where state actor arrested sober driver, allowing drunk pas-
senger to drive car), and Cornelius v. Town of Highland Lake, 880 F.2d 348, 358
19981
25
Madden: Signs of Danger - The Third Circuit Emphasizes Foreseeability as
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1998
VILLANovA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 43: p. 947
fore, in this fact-sensitive area, it may be most advantageous for practition-
ers to draw comparisons between their cases and those cases in which the
theory was found to apply, and to distinguish their cases from those cases
that were dismissed.11 0
Christina M. Madden
(11 th Cir. 1989) (finding state-created danger where town enlisted dangerous pris-
oners to work around town hall and town clerk was kidnapped), with Uhlrig v.
Harder, 64 F.3d 567, 575 (10th Cir. 1995) (finding no state-created danger where
state actors placed dangerous patient in general hospital population and therapist
was killed), and Gregory v. City of Rogers, 974 F.2d 1006, 1011-12 (8th Cir. 1992)
(finding no state-created danger where state-actor required sober driver to go into
police station, leaving two intoxicated drivers in running car).
110. See Eaton & Wells, supra note 2, at 159 ("Courts cannot, and in any event
should not, avoid fact sensitive inquiries as to state involvement in individual
cases."); see also Tennyson, supra note 6, at 1072 ("There is a hint that determina-
tions of duty for the school system are fact-specific inquires. If this is so, lower
courts still have a great deal of leniency and very little assistance in finding du-
ties."). In addition to drawing comparisons, the practitioner should use other the-
ories, such as special relationship, entitlement and equal protection. See DeShaney
v. Winnebago County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 195 (1989) (leaving ques-
tion open as to whether state child protective laws provide entitlement to protec-
tion); Hynson v. City of Chester, 864 F.2d 1026, 1031 (3d Cir. 1988) (setting forth
test for equal protection claims in domestic violence cases); Coffman v. Wilson
Police Dep't, 739 F. Supp. 257, 264 (E.D. Pa. 1990) (finding that issuance of re-
straining order in domestic violence case gives rise to legitimate claim of entitle-
ment); see also Blum, supra note 4, at 437 (stating that "plaintiffs unable to cast
their cases in the relatively narrow substantive due process mold carved out by
DeShaney have still succeeded by framing the case as a procedural due process or
an equal protection claim") (footnotes omitted).
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